On the second day of Rosh HaShanah it is customary to read the story of the Akedah (עקדה), the binding of Isaac (Gen. 22:1–19), which is included within Vayeira (וירא). According to the story, G-d commands Abraham to offer his son Isaac as a sacrifice, Abraham obediently takes Isaac to Mount Moriah (later the site of the Jewish Temple) and binds him on an altar, but an angel of the Lord appears at the last moment to stay Abraham's hand.
What was the purpose of the Akedah? In accordance with Gen. 22:12 ("now I know that you fear G-d"), it is traditionally understood as a test of Abraham's obedience to divine commandment. But this reading is troubling because, as Søren Kierkegaard pointed out, the test seems to require a "teleological suspension of the ethical." In other words, in order to obey G-d's command, Abraham must apparently renounce his ethical duty to nurture, protect, and care for his own son. Divine command and ethical duty are thus counterposed.
On Rosh HaShanah 5771, I learned that the Hebrew word mitzvah (מצוה), commonly translated as commandment, means "connection" in Aramaic. This opens up the possibility of finding a different meaning in the Akedah. What if Abraham is seeking not to obey, but to connect with his G-d?
As Rashi points out, G-d never instructs Abraham to "slaughter" (לשחוט) Isaac, but rather to "bring him up there" (העלהו שם) to Mount Moriah (Gen. 22:2). The Hebrew verb "to bring him up" (להעלותו) shares the same root as olah (עלה), the "ascending offering" described in Leviticus chap. 1, which is completely burned up by the fire on top of the altar. And G-d does indeed instruct Abraham to give Isaac the status of an עלה. But these words also share the same root as aliyah (עלייה), "ascent," as in spiritual ascent to the bimah or the Land of Israel. What kind of ascent is intended here and by what means?
Perhaps Abraham mistakenly thinks that the only way to connect with his G-d, to ascend spiritually, to return the divine spark in his son to its original root and source, is through the annihilation of his son. This would make the Akedah akin to the religious suicides once practiced in India. Emile Durkheim, in his classic sociological study of suicide, described such suicides this way: "We actually see the individual in all these cases seek to strip himself of his personal being in order to be engulfed in something which he regards as his true essence." To be sure, the Akedah is a story of sacrifice, not self-sacrifice--but if Abraham's love for his son causes him to identify so strongly with him that he cannot lose Isaac without losing some part of himself, this may not be a significant distinction for him.
If this reading is correct, Abraham's mistake is to think that connection with his G-d requires complete self-abnegation (or abnegation of others). The purpose of the Akedah may not be to test his obedience so much as teach him that connection with his G-d be cannot come at the expense of his connection with his son (and, by extension, his connection with other human beings). On the contrary, as the Hassidic tzaddik Mendel of Kosov preached, love for one's neighbor (or son) is only another side of the love of G-d. "If a man loves his fellow," Mendel taught, "the Divine Presence rests with them." In this way, they ascend together. The Akedah is therefore indeed instructive, but its purpose cannot be to provide an omniscient G-d with knowledge that G-d must already possess; rather, it is instructive for human beings.
